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ThE W a r W bhiN a W a r :
Vie t n a m E r a MiliTARy

DissENT

in t Me

Ja im es R. H a y e s

The signing o f the Indochina peace agreements in early 1973
officially ended American participation in the Vietnam conflict. Military
officials would probably be the first to admit that they, more than any
other group in society, experienced the first sigh of relief. Throughout
most of the war, the military was subjected to invectives emanating from
a war-weary civilian sector, as well as disgruntled, ant iwar, anti-military
GIs. While civil-military relations have a well-documented tradition of
animosity, organized protest within the ranks is without parallel in
Am erican military history.1 For military traditionalists, the presence of
a small but vocal minority of soldiers raising the old ideal o f a “democratic
military” produced some acute anxiety. Contrary to its functionalist
image of human nature and dissent , the military was forced to come to
grips with the reality that internal discontent ran deeper than the mere
disaffections of a few disruptive, “bad” individuals.2
This essay describes and analyzes the effort by a minority of GIs
to create an antiwar, anti-military movement within the Vietnam-era
military. An attenuated chronology of the movement is presented along
with an analysis of what appeared to be the major causal variables in its
genesis and development.

ThE MiliTARy FiqhTS I t s e U
Beginning in the latter part of the 1960s, an unprecedented
movement of soldier dissent gathered momentum. Originating primarily
as an antiwar movement, it escalated to a point where it was a force
waging a battle against military authority and legitimacy.
While
desertion. AWOLs, drug use, and even fraggings have long plagued the
United Stales military, organized resistance appears to be a uniquely
Vietnam-era phenomenon. The social movement characteristics exhibited
by the movement (e.g., a sense of group identity and solidarity, consciously
articulated ideologies, movement organizations) distinguished it from
other more spontaneous and transitory uprisings such as the “Back
Home M ovement” in the aftermath of World W ar II. Adjustment
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responses such as drug use and various types of withdrawal reactions
such as desertion and AW OL will not be discussed in the context ol this
art icle; the degree to which these various forms of dissent are politically
motivated is open to debate.3
Although there was one well publicized instance o f an officers’
organization—The Concerned Officers Movement (COM), and antiwar
group that disassociated itself from the more radical GI groups— and a
lesser-known and smaller group—The Concerned Graduates of the
Military, Naval, and Air Force Academies, headquartered in San Francisco
and largely limited to ex-officers in that area— the GI movement was for
the most part comprised of lower-ranking enlisted personnel (“enlisted"
referring to st at us and not to mode of entiy into the service), predominant ly
Arm y but cutting across all branches of the armed services. Short of
revolutionary in outlook and ideology, the movement aimed primarily at
institutional structural reform. There was no accurate measure of the
numerical strength of the movement, and the estimates vary according
to source— the military appears to underestimate while movement
sympathizers tend to exaggerated It is safe to say, however, that the
movement represented only a small fraction of GIs.

TH e E a r I y Y e a r s
Like other movements of the period, the GI movement emerged
in a rather piecemeal and disorderly fashion. Movements tend to emerge
as rather amorphous, poorly organized, and fonnless entities, develop in
periods of cultural drift, and the early action tends to be individualistic
in nature and lackinggroup consciousness. The GI movement witnessed
its beginning in a series of individual acts of resistance against the war.
These initial exemplary acts occurred during a period (1965-1967) in
which the Vietnam conflict and American military involvement in it were
becoming increasingly important concerns for both the civilian and
military sectors.
One of the first publicized incidents of resistance occurred in
November of 1965 when Lt. Henry H. Howe, Jr. participated in an
antiwar demonstration in El Paso, Texas. How was court-martialed and
charged with disrespectful utterances toward public officials for carrying
a sign which read: “End Johnson’s Fascist Aggression in Vietnam ,” and
“Let's Have More Than a Choice Between Petty Ignorant Fascists in
1968." In December, 1965, Howe was convicted and sentenced to two
years hard labor (later reduced to one) and dishonorably discharged.
Howe’s conviction raised the ire of some because the military presented
no clear evidence that Howe’s conduct threatened military discipline and
order, particularly in light of the fact that he was off-duty as well as out
of uniform.
The most celebrated case of GI antiwar resistance during 1966
took place on June 30, when three enlisted men at Fort Hood refused
shipment to Vietnam on the grounds that it was an immoral war. The
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refusal by Pvt. Dennis Mora, Pfc. Jam es Johnson, and Pvt. David Samas
was the first case of overt resistance against shipment to the war zone.
All were given dishonorable discharges and forfeiture of all pay; Samas
and Johnson were sentenced to five years at hard labor, Mora to three.
The case of the “Fort Hood Three” gained broader significance when a
number o f civilian activists became involved in it in an effort to make it
a cause celebre. Although most civilian activists still viewed the GI with
some disdain, a few were beginning to realize that the GI could be a
potential ally in the antiwar struggle.
Perhaps the most significant and important individual act of
antiwar resistance in the entire 1965-1967 period was the case of Capt.
Howard Levy. Levy, a dennatologist, refused to train Green Beret medics
for duty in Vietnam, citing the commission of war crimes by the special
forces as one reason. Levy was accused not only of disobeying an order,
but also of attempting to “crush the spirit” of enlisted men with his
continued criticism of the war. On June 3, 1967, Levy was sentenced to
three years hard labor and dismissed from the service. The Levy case
received nationwide attention and the military had created a martyr.
Less than two months after Levy’s conviction, two black marines, Pfc.
George Daniels and Cpl. William Harvey, were arrested for taking part
in a barracks discussion where they argued that blacks should not take
part in the Vietnam war. They were convicted; Daniels was sentenced
to ten years hard labor and Harvey to six. Their conviction and
subsequent sentencing not only raised more questions about extreme
military oppression but was also attacked as racist. Another case o f
officer resistance to the war also took place in 1967 when Air Force Capt.
Dale Noyd was convicted and imprisoned for refusing to train pilots for
Vietnam.
The above examples constitute only a select number of antiwar
acts that occurred in 1965-1967. The formative years o f the movement
were typified by a number of different individuals engaging in similar
behaviors, but acting independently o f each other with no real
communication existing among them. The early resisters played a key
role by drawing attention to the possibility of political dissent in the
military, and, perhaps more importantly, by using the war issue as a
vehicle, they brought to the surface the larger issue constitutional rights
for military personnel, particularly enlisted persons. They did, however,
suffer a heavy toll for their actions as prison sentences and dishonorable
discharges constituted the backbone of the military defense.

H ie Biq Y ea r : 1968
'fhe individual acts of confrontation which characterized the
1965-1967 years continued throughout the duration of the war. Beginning
in 1968. the frequency of individual acts of resistance declined, and
dissent of a collective nature look precedence. It was also in 1968 that
some of the defining traits of a social movement were first discernible.
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What had been uncoordinated and disconnected acts of resistance
began to coalesce around an organizational framework. The organizational
network was decentralized (in that no central decision-making
headquarters existed) and segmented (in the sense that a number of
groups arose and operated essentially independent of each other, linked
only by a common mission and communications network. Consciousness
of membership and joint interact ion were created by the establishment
of the G1 underground press— The Bond, FFA, Vietnam GI, The Ally— and
coffeehouses— Mad Anthony’s and the UFO. Movement cells, such as
the American Servicemen’s Union (ASU) and theFTA, developed programs
and ideologies. The ASU and FTAwere followed in 1969 by the GIs United
Against the W ar in Vietnam (GIs— United), and the Movement for a
Democratic Military (MDM). In May of 1969, the GI Alliance was
constituted in Washington to serve as an umbrella organization with the
intention of coordinating the actions of the various movement cells.
While the specific ideological positions of the GI groups varied, their
goals overlapped considerably and called for such things as an end to
racism in the military, collective bargaining, federal minimum wage
standards, and, most importantly, full constitutional rights for all
enlisted people.5
1968 proved to be a banner year for the GI movement in a variety
of ways. Collective resistance against the war came to the forefront and
manifested itself in a variety of styles. In addition to the war-related
protest, stockade rebellions added a new dimension to GI resistance.
A new strain of antiwar resistance originated in 1968 as a
number of military personnel across the country took sanctuary in
various churches and universities. In July, nine GIs representing all
four sendees chained themselves together inside a San Francisco church
and held a 48-hour vigil in protest of the war. Arm y Pfc. Michael Locianto
was arrested in August after he had taken sanctuary in a Greenwich
Village church following his refusal lo g o to Vietnam. Also protesting the
war. Marine Cpl. Paul Olimpieri took sanctuaiy in the Harvard Divinity
School in the fall of 1968. In November, Army Pvt. John Michael
O’Connor was arrested by milit ary police after he had taken refuge in the
Student Union at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology;
approximately 1,000 MIT students fried to shield O’Connor from the
police in that instance. On November 8th, Arm y Pvt. William Brakefield
and Airman David Copp were arrested after they had sought sanctuaiy
on the campus of New York City College. The use of sanctuaries—
particularly churches—by antiwar GIs was increasingly facilitated as
more and more clergy adopted an antiwar stance.
There was a dramatic growth in the number of GIs part icipat ing
in antiwar demonstrations and teach-ins in 1968. The most significant
participation occurred on October 12 when GI and civilian antiwar
marches were held in Los Angeles, Atlanta, Washington DC, New York,
and Chicago. The Veterans Stars and Stripes f o r Peace reported that an
estimated 200 GIs led the march in Chicago. Approxim ately 700 GIs took
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part in the October 12 march in San Francisco. At Fort Campbell,
Kentucky, 35 GIs held an October 12th antiwar rally in sympathy with
the nationwide protests. The stockade was turned back over to the
authorities only after the m ilitary police were ordered to shoot to kill. A n
estimated 40-50 prisoners from the Navy, Marines, and Arm y held the
stockade in Da Nang, Vietnam for three days in August, protesting poor
condit ions and military authoritarianism; once cell-block was burned to
the ground in this eruption. Also in Vietnam during August, GIs revolted
at the Long Binh stockade, and a GI was killed by the military police and
another 59 were wounded. The most publicized case of collective
resistance wit hin stockades occurred in October when 27 inmates of the
Presidio stockade (San Francisco) mutinied in protest over the slaying of
a fellow prisoner.0 The trial of the “Presidio 27” brought massive criticism
upon the military due to the severe nat ure of the punishment meted out
to resisters. As a result of extreme pressure, the m ilitary reduced many
of the sentences.
Stockade rebellions increased after 1968 and brought with them
increased publicity over the less than adequate conditions under which
inmates were forced to live. More importantly, stockade rebellions
served to emphasize what a growing number of GIs were beginning to
realize: the military’s basic denial o f any kind of rights and freedoms for
enlisted individuals.
Although the above account of resistance in 1968 deals only with
a small number o f cases, it does illustrate that resistance was not only
taking on a collective nature but it also was no longer solely confined to
the war issue. More and more enlisted people were defining the military
per se as oppressive, and deciding to confront it rather than withdraw.
As l he self-generated protest increased, dissident GIs saw larger numbers
of civilian radicals and antiwar groups taking an interest in them and
willing to aid them in their struggle.

TH e FiNAl PERiod
In 1969 and the following years, the issue of constitutional rights
came to the forefront of the GI movement. The war, however, remained
the most appropriate vehicle for confronting the issue. This larger
concern had been precipitated by the m ilitary’s reaction to and handling
of antiwar dissenters.
The military inadvertently pricked the
consciousness of some hitherto uninvolved GIs and civilians by its
heavy-handed repression o f initial dissent. The dilemma confronting the
movement at that time was one of transforming what appeared to be a
growing body of partisan support into active support. In general,
enlisted personnel were aware that any gains made by the movement
would be in the form of “public goods,” benefits which would accrue to
all GIs regardless of whether or not they took an active role in the
movement. Although initially direct confrontation of military authority,
such as refusals of orders and distribution of “subversive” literature on
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base, functioned as the main tactic, less risky behavior, such as rap
sessions and political meetings in the barracks, were also employed with
the hope that these relatively safe actions would increasingly involve
larger numbers of GIs. Despite these efforts, the m ajority of the GIs
preferred to remain sympathetic bystanders.
In 1970, GI participation in antiwar demonstrations was
considerable. Although the possibility of punitive sanctions loomed
large, the 1969 directive on dissent issued by the Department o f Defense
made such participation legal if the demonstration was off the base in the
United States, and if GIs participating were off-duty and out of uniform.
Various GI papers stressed the legality of participation and many
advertised names and addresses o f lawyers willing to defend any GI
punished for participating. The largest nation-wide participation of GIs
was in May, 1970 in what the GIs termed “Armed Farces Day.” This
demonstration was held in conjunction with the tradition Armed Forces
Day celebrations. GIs at Fort Hood, Fort Bliss, Fort Bragg, Fort Lewis,
Fort Devens, and other bases turned out to protest the war and the
military. Estimates of the numbers involved ranged from 1,500 at Fort
Bragg and 500 at Fort Hood down to 20-30 at Fort Devens.7 Black
soldiers continued to step up their fight against racism. In July, 250
black GIs revolted at Fort Hood, burning two “Re-Up” offices and a BEQ
building. At Fort Carson, also during July, 200 black soldiers seized a
section of the base while fighting off the military police. In Heidelberg,
West Gennany, 1000 black and white GIs held a July rally against racism
in the army. While these demonstrations by black m ilitary personnel
were not the first signs of growing antiracist sentiment, the expanding
scope and intensity of this resistance in conjunction with the antiwar,
anti-military position of m any white enlisted people did present a
formidable threat to the brass... at least the military defined it as such.
By 1971, there were approximately 26 anti-military and antiwar
coffeehouses, along with an estimated 144 underground GI papers and
a nationwide network of GI counseling sendees.8 The estimate of 144
newspapers may seem unreasonable, but a significant number of these
papers were very short-lived due to financial problems, military
harassment, and staff turnovers. The papers themselves fell into two
general categories: 1) “base papers” which dealt primarily with the
act ivities on a part icular base and were generally confined to that specific
military installation; and, 2) “national papers” representing more of a
news sendee publication, which detailed resistance and court-martial
cases at bases all across the country and overseas. The national papers
were distributed all of the U.S. and abroad to GIs and interested civilians,
largely through subscriptions and clandestine distribution networks,
including to units in Vietnam. Through the GI press, activist GIs were
aware that their colleagues at other bases were engaged in similar acts
of resist ance, and they were constant ly informed of the responses ol the
military authorities. The papers continually published self-help items
for GIs, informing them of various groups and lawyers willing to defend
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them, as well as informing them about such things as conscientious
objection and rights under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. The
establishment and proliferation of the GI press served to bridge some of
the structural limitations GIs faced in regard to communication and
mobility, and helped to foster a feeling a membership and interaction
between activist GIs and movement cell organizations.
In 1971 and 1972 resistance directed against the military and
the war continued. GIs joined civilians in demonstrations around the
country, as well as conducting their own protests on posts. In addition
to resistance and U.S. military installations, there were numerous
reports out of Vietnam detailing refusals to engage the enemy on the part
of some combat troops. While GI and antiwar civilian groups were quick
to exploit the different protests as indicative of the strength of the GI
movement, there remains some question as to whether these incidents
were indeed related to the GI movement orm ore a result of the immediate
situational contingencies of combat. While the GI movement may have
been, in part, a m otivating factor behind the sporadic instances of
combat refusal in Vietnam, it is equally true that the movement was
basically ineffectual in creating any type of massive resistance among
combat troops. Similar examples o f troop demoralization occurred in
Korea as that war was winding down.

H iE DiAlECTics of R e s is t a n c e
As was pointed out above, the initial phase of the GI movement
(1965-1967) was characterized by a number of individuals protesting the
war, with no real communication among themselves and probably not
even any knowledge of each other’s acts. These individual acts of
resistance arose in a period of “cultural drift” symbolized by the
beginnings of a serious questioning of the legitimacy and purpose of the
Vietnam war by many segments of the American public. This growing
sentiment combined with a Cold W ar ambivalence among many,
particularly liberals, to the increasing size and dominance of the military
establishment in Am erican society. It was also significant that many of
the initial acts of resistance by military personnel, especially the most
publicized ones, were earned out by officers. Their dissent was given
more credence by the public, and the severe sanctions by the military—
in an atmosphere which was becoming increasingly hostile to the war
effort and the military— created a number of heroes. In a climate of
opinion where civil liberties and the right to dissent were increasingly
brought to public attention through the civil rights movement and the
beginnings o f student dissent, the m ilitary’s response of rather harsh
sentencing did not go unnoticed. The m ilitary’s decision to severely
sanction some of its own kind (officers) for protesting a war which more
and more civilians were coming to question was seen by m any as a
repressive rather than a justified disciplinary measure.
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In 1968 antiwar sentim ent increased as did antiwar
confrontations. It was also the year in which the total number of active
duty enlisted personnel reached its peak for the Vietnam conflict and the
year in which draft inductions for the army hit the top level of 334,222.9
The military, particularly the A rm y, was confronted with a mass of young
people, many of whom were in the military against their will, required to
fight a war in which many of them did not believe. The fact that all of them
had been exposed to and some had participated in antiwar demonstrations
and they know were all grouped together on various military bases gave
rise to certain self-generated action among enlisted people. Resistance
look place as some GIs acted against the war explicitly, and, in so doing,
implicitly tested the degree to which enlisted personnel enjoy constitutional
rights. Confronted with a situation which they perceived to be a real
threat to discipline and morale, the military continued to respond in a
manner best described as panic. Their immediate response, typical of
a regime feeling itself threatened, consisted of swift and harsh punitive
action. As resistance reared its head beyond the individual acts of 19651967, the Pentagon ordered a hard-nosed position against dissenters.10
The expressed rationale for a policy o f harsh suppression hinged on the
military’s need for discipline and control, while the latent intention
continued to be a scare tactic designed to intimidate other GIs.
For activist GIs, the m ilitary’s policy of handling dissent not only
increased the sense of struggle but also provided the movement with
more publicity than they could generate themselves. The military,
already under attack for Vietnam, was now roundly criticized for its
handling of dissident GIs and its blatant denial of the constitutional
guarantees o f freedom of press, assembly, and speech. The handling of
political activists helped to raise some fundamental issues that perhaps
would not have surfaced had the military initially pursued a different
policy.
It was at this time (1968) that civilian activists started to view the
GI as a potential ally in the antiwar, anticapitalism struggle. Prior to
1968 those who accepted induction into the armed forces were written
off as potential radical partisans. Antiwar organizations and other
radical groups began to add GI names to their mailing lists, and
coffeehouses were set up near military bases by civilians with the
purpose of providing a place where GIs could congregate and vent their
hostilities. The coffeehouses were also an attempt on the part of the
largely middle-class antiwar movement to break down the barriers
between themselves and their working-class counterparts in the military.
Civilian groups provided GIs with legal defense as well. Quite cognizant
that court-martials would be readily forthcoming for radical GIs,
organizations such as the Am erican Civil Liberties Union, National
Emergency Civil Liberties Union, and the GI Civil Defense Committee
offered their support. These organizations generated considerable
publicity for the cases in which they were involved. Undoubtedly, more
GIs were willing to run the risk of dissent with the realization that a
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defense network was established to challenge any punitive action on the
part o f the military. In addition to some important legal victories, the
adverse publicity directed against the military and its system of justice
has led military authorities into a more rigorous scrutiny of both the case
they wish to prosecute and the types o f punishment they wish to dole out.
In response to growing dissent and mounting adverse publicity
for the military, Secretary of the Arm y Stanley Resor issued a
memorandum in May of 1969 titled “Guidance on Dissent.” The
statement instructed commanders to adopt a more relaxed attitude with
regard to GI coffeehouses, the GI press, and political resistance in
general. Too liberal for some, especially the House Arm ed Services
Committee, the guidelines were reissued in September, 1969. The
revised statement in effect wiped out the recommendations for tolerance
in the initial directive. The new directive de-emphasized constitutional
restraints on commanders and at the same time added to their repressive
options. Notably absent from the revised document was the phrase “to
impose only such minimum restraints as are necessary to enable the
Army to perform its m ission.” 11 The military found itself, or perhaps
placed itself, in an unenviable position. In attempting to short-circuit
what they considered to be a serious breakdown in discipline and
morale, the inadvertently spawned a growing body of criticism of the
military justice system and specifically of the Uniform Code of Military
Justice.
While the m ilitary’s inexperience with political resistance did
lead them to err and overreact on many occasions, they did learn from
their mistakes. In the years following 1969, they made greater use of
administrative discharges and in general pursued a somewhat more
tolerant position vis-a-vis dissent.

ThE GI M o v e m e n t : A

n

A

ssessm en t

In terms of its stated goals and objectives, which, aside from
ending the war, involved m ainly institutional structural reform, the GI
movement was, not surprisingly, far from successful. It is difficult to
believe that even the most die-hard GI organizers ever felt the movement
could produce major changes in an organization as firmly entrenched as
the military. The movement made a discernible, yet largely ineffective,
attempt at fostering subversion within the ranks. There are a number
of possible explanations for the m ovem ent’s failure to create an effective
challenge on a mass scale against the Vietnam-era military. Some of the
more glaring ones can be singled out here.
The GI movement was inextricably intertwined with the New Left.
In the course of its development, the organized element of the movement
found itself relying more and more on this sector of the civilian
population. While the outside support was necessary if the movement
was to transcend some of the limitations in political resourcesconfronting
it. the GI movement became to “civilianized,” particularly in its ideological
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orientation.
As the movement began to gather momentum and,
correspondingly, the civilian input loomed larger and larger, the middle
class ideological rhetoric of the New Left began to overshadow some of
the more pragmatic day-to-day concerns of the GIs themselves. The
feeling of helplessness and powerlessness that m any GIs felt could not
be adequately dealt with by sweeping references to “im perialism ” and the
“military industrial com plex.”
If one grants that an extremely inequitable Vietnam-era draft
resulted in a predominantly lower-middle and working-class military, it
seems reasonable to conclude that the middle-class emphasis that the
organized element of the movement adopted under New Left influence
lacked meaning for a significant number of GIs. As the movement
strayed from issues directly related to the immediate self-interest of GIs,
it increasingly reduced the possibility of mobilizing the discontent of
large numbers o f enlisted personnel. In a v e iy real sense, the movement
failed to integrate itself with the “ordinary” nonideological GI.
Another reason for the m ovement’s failure to mobilize massive
discontent stemmed from its own internal contradictions. Factionalism
developed over tactics. There were also disputes over the proper role that
civilian radicals should play in the GI movement. A m ajor point of
contention concerned those groups who, on the one hand, maintained
that civilians should provide support to GIs but leave the actual control
and operation of project to the GIs themselves (such as the Student
Mobilization Committee, and United States Servicemen's Fund), and
those groups who, on the other hand, wanted to function as a type of
vanguard party leading the struggle against the military (such as the
Socialist Workers Party/Young Socialist Alliance and the Youth Against
War and Fascism). The orientation of the former groups appeared to be
directed more toward democratizing the military, while that of the latter
seemed more concerned with creating a broader revolutionary youth
cohort. It was the latter who turned out to be more vociferous, and the
GI movement came to be identified with them.
Although the GI movement claims to have been a significant
factor in instigating troop dissent in Vietnam, there is little evidence to
support this contention. The sporadic cases of troops refusing to go into
combat, and acts such as fraggings appear to have been inspired by
factors more or less separate from the stateside GI movement. Rather
than viewing combat refusals as consequences of the GI movement, it
seems more reasonable to interpret both phenomena as products of the
anti-Vietnam war malaise affecting the larger society. As the war
continued, reports from Vietnam indicated that more and more GIs were
sharing the same disillusionment with the war as Am ericans at home
were experiencing.
The GI movement was also ineffective in dealing with racial
issues.12 Some of the organizations did have a multi-racial membership
base, but the black participants seemed to be token members. Black
soldiers began forming their own organizations in an effort to meet the
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needs of black service personnel. For the most part, black GIs were
waging a separate battle with military authorities. From the perspective
of black GIs, their battle was qualitatively different from the one being
conducted by the whites. Black soldiers discovered that the m ilitary was
a microcosm of Am erican society and that the problems confronting
blacks in the military were not significantly different from those which
faced them in the civilian world. Just as the New Left organizations failed
to bring about a desired coalition with blacks and other minorities in
civilian society, so the GI movement proved deficient in this realm as
well.

S ummary ANd C oncIusIon
The GI m ovement made a discernible, but largely ineffective
attempt to foster subversion within the ranks. It failed to mobilize the
discontent of the large bulk of GIs into a unified antiwar, anti-military
force. To be sure, part o f the failure stemmed from the fact that those
who were most radical in the 1960s were also those who enjoyed
deferments from military service. While a few entered the m ilitary with
the avowed purpose of organizing, most remained on the outside and
attempted to organize GIs from that vantage point. This not only
engendered a certain degree of resentment on the part of GIs, but the
“outsiders” were unable, or perhaps unwilling, to grasp the concerns of
GIs. Though the movement had to rely on civilian support to get off the
ground, civilian groups appear to have co-opted the m ovement in an
attempt to exploit GI resistance for ideological purposes. The New Left
was never able to overcome its elitism. The same mistake had been made
in the abortive effort to radicalize workers. Even for GIs who were
sympat hetic to the GI m ovem ent’s aims, the lack of a clear-cut strategy
and program of action resulted in the overshadowing of the hoped for
gains by the very real risks involved in striving for them. In simple terms,
it was not worth it.
Although the movement faltered partially because of its own
internal contradictions, its inability to radicalize a large constituency of
GIs was, in the final analysis, testimony to the m ilitary’s system of social
control. The military went a long way in defusing dissent after it had
learned from its initial mistakes.1
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